Weisberg (2009) introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization (Jeffrey 1983), and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg’s paradox. Weisberg (2014) argues that perceptual undermining also poses a problem for ranking theory (Spohn 2012) and for Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer 1976). In this note I argue that perceptual undermining does not pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weisberg’s paradox is a false alarm.
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Author Name: Franz Huber
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Keywords: Bayesian epistemology, Jeffrey conditionalization, perceptual undermining, ranking theory, Weisberg’s paradox
ISSN: 1584-174X
EISSN: 2392-6260
EOI/DOI: 10.5840/symposion2014118
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